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Abstract 
This paper is directed towards combining Pearl's 
structural-model approach to causal reasoning 
with high-level formalisms for reasoning about 
actions. More precisely, we present a combi­
nation of Pearl's structural-model approach with 
Poole's independent choice logic. We show how 
probabilistic theories in the independent choice 
logic can be mapped to probabilistic causal 
models. This mapping provides the independent 
choice logic with appealing concepts of causal­
ity and explanation from the structural-model 
approach. We illustrate this along Halpern and 
Pearl's sophisticated notions of actual cause, ex­
planation, and partial explanation. This mapping 
also adds first-order modeling capabilities and 
explicit actions to the structural-model approach. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Handling causality is an important issue, which emerges in 
many applications in AI. The existing approaches to causal­
ity in the AI literature can be roughly divided into those that 
have been developed as modal nonmonotonic logics ( espe­
cially in the context of logic programming) and those that 
evolved from the area of Bayesian networks. A represen­
tative of the former is Geffner's modal nonmonotonic logic 
for handling causal knowledge [14, 15], which has been 
inspired by default reasoning from conditional knowledge 
bases. More specialized modal-logic based formalisms 
play an important role in dealing with causal knowledge 
about actions and change; see especially the work by 
Turner [36] and the references therein for an overview. A 
representative of the latter is Pearl's approach to modeling 
causality by structural equations [2, 12, 28, 29], which is 
central to a number of recent research efforts. In particular, 
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the evaluation of deterministic and probabilistic counter­
factuals has been explored, which is at the core of problems 
in fault diagnosis, planning, decision making, and determi­
nation of liability [2]. It has been shown that the structural­
model approach allows a precise modeling of many impor­
tant causal relationships, which can especially be used in 
natural language processing [ 12]. An axiomatization of 
reasoning about causal formulas in the structural-model ap­
proach has been given by Halpern [ 16]. 
Concepts of causality also play an important role in the 
generation of explanations, which are of crucial importance 
in areas like planning, diagnosis, natural language process­
ing, and probabilistic inference. Different notions of expla­
nations have been studied quite extensively, see especially 
[19, 13, 34] for philosophical work, and [27, 35, 20] for 
work in AI that is related to Bayesian networks. A criti­
cal examination of such approaches from the viewpoint of 
explanations in probabilistic systems is given in [6]. 
In recent papers [17, 18], Halpern and Pearl formalized 
causality using a model-based definition, which allows for 
a precise modeling of many important causal relationships. 
Using a notion of weak cause, they propose appealing defi­
nitions of actual cause [17] and of causal explanation [18]. 
As they show, their notions of actual cause and causal 
explanation, which is very different from the concept of 
causal explanation in [24, 26, 14], models well many prob­
lematic examples in the literature. As for computation, 
Biter and Lukasiewicz [7, 8, 9] analyzed the complexity 
of these notions and identified tractable cases, and Hop­
kins [21] explored search-based strategies for computing 
actual causes in the general and restricted settings. 
However, structural causal models, and thus also the above 
notions of actual cause and causal explanation, have only a 
limited expressiveness in the sense that (i) they do not allow 
for first-order modeling, and (ii) they only allow for explic­
itly setting the values of endogenous variables (also called 
an intervention) as actions, but not for explicit actions as in 
well-known formalisms for reasoning about actions. 
There are a number of formalisms for probabilistic reason-
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ing about actions. In particular, Bacchus et al. [I] propose a 
probabilistic generalization of the situation calculus, which 
is based on first-order logics of probability, and which al­
lows one to reason about an agent's probabilistic degrees of 
belief and how these beliefs change when actions are exe­
cuted. Poole's independent choice logic [30, 31] is based 
on acyclic logic programs under different "choices". Each 
choice along with the acyclic logic program produces a 
first-order model. By placing a probability distribution over 
the different choices, one then obtains a distribution over 
the set of first-order models. Other probabilistic extensions 
of the situation calculus are given in [25, II]. A probabilis­
tic extension of the action language A is given in [3]. 
The main idea behind this paper is to develop a combi­
nation of Pearl's structural-model approach to (probabilis­
tic) causal reasoning with high-level formalisms for (prob­
abilistic) reasoning about actions. To this end, we present 
a combination of Pearl's structural-model approach with 
Poole's independent choice logic. We show how proba­
bilistic theories in the independent choice logic [30, 31] 
can be translated into probabilistic causal models. This 
translation provides the independent choice logic with ap­
pealing concepts of causality and explanation from the 
structural-model approach. We illustrate this along Halpern 
and Pearl's notions of actual cause and causal explanation. 
This mapping also adds first-order modeling capabilities 
and explicit actions to the structural-model approach. 
The work closest in spirit to this paper is perhaps the re­
cent one by Hopkins and Pearl [22], which combines the 
situation calculus [33] with the structural model-approach. 
However, the generated causal models are much differ­
ent from the ones in this paper. First, and as a central 
conceptual difference, Hopkins and Pearl consider a stan­
dard situation calculus formalization, which allows for ex­
pressing uncertainty about the initial situation, but which 
does not allow for uncertain effects of actions. In this pa­
per, however, we consider Poole's independent choice logic 
[30, 31], which is a first-order formalism that allows both 
for probabilistic uncertainty about the initial situation and 
about the effects of actions. Second, the work [22] focuses 
only on counterfactual and probabilistic counterfactual rea­
soning, while our work here extends the notions of actual 
cause, explanation, and partial explanation to the indepen­
dent choice logic. Third, [22] focuses only on hypothetical 
reasoning about subsequences of an initially fixed sequence 
of actions, while our approach here basically allows for hy­
pothetical reasoning about any actions and fluent values. 
Note that also Poole [32] defines a notion of explanation 
for his independent choice logic. However, Poole's no­
tion of explanation in [32] is based on abductive reason­
ing and assumes that explanations are defined over choice 
atoms. Our notion of explanation in this paper, in contrast, 
is based on causal reasoning in structural causal models, 
and assumes that explanations are defined over endogenous 
variables. Hence, our concept of explanation here is con­
ceptually much different from the one by Poole in [32]. 
2 CAUSAL MODELS 
In this section, we recall some basic concepts from Pearl's 
structural-model approach to causality [2, 12, 28, 29]. In 
particular, we recall causal and probabilistic causal models. 
2.1 PRELIMINARIES 
We assume a set of random variables. Every variable Xi 
may take on values from a nonempty domain D(Xi )· A 
value for a set of variables X is a mapping x that associates 
with each Xi EX an element of D(Xi ) (for X =  0, the 
unique value is the empty mapping 0). The domain of X, 
denoted D(X), is the set of all values for X. For Yt;X 
and x E D(X), denote by xiY the restriction of x toY. For 
disjoint sets of variables X, Y, and values x E D(X), y E 
D(Y), denote by xy the union of x andy. We often identify 
singletons {Xi} with Xi , and their values x with x (Xi ). 
2.2 CAUSAL MODELS 
A causal model M = (U, V, F) consists of two disjoint 
sets U and V of exogenous and endogenous variables, 
respectively, and a set F = {Fx I X E V }  of functions 
Fx : D(PAx )--+ D(X) that assign a value of X to each 
value of the parents PAx c; U U V \ {X} of X. The val­
ues u E D(U) are also called contexts. A probabilistic 
causal model M = ((U, V, F), P) consists of a causal 
model (U, V, F) and a probability function P on D(U). 
We focus here on the principal class [17] of recursive 
causal models M = (U, V, F) in which a total ordering -< 
on V exists such that Y E PAx implies Y-< X, for all 
X, Y E V .  In such models, every assignment to the ex­
ogenous variables U = u determines a unique value y for 
every set of endogenous variables Y c; V,  denoted YM(u) 
(or simply Y(u)). For any causal model M = (U, V, F), 
set of variables X c; V,  and value x E D(X), the causal 
model Mx =x = (U, V\X, Fx =x), where Fx =x = {F� I 
Y E V \ X} and each F� is obtained from Fy by setting X 
to x, is a submodel of M. We abbreviate Mx =x and Fx =x 
by Mx and Fx, respectively. For Y c; V ,  we abbreviate 
YM. (u) by Yx(u). A causal or probabilistic causal model 
is binary iff ID(X)I = 2 for all endogenous variables X. 
Example 2.1 (stopping robot) Suppose a mobile robot de­
tects the presence of an obstacle. Then, the command stop 
is executed by the control system, which activates two 
brakes 1 and 2 (wheels behind and ahead), and the robot 
stops. The robot can stop using only one of the two brakes. 
This scenario can be modeled by the following recursive 
causal model M = (U, V, F). The exogenous variables are 
given by U = {U8}, where D(Us) = {0, 1}, and U8 is 1 iff 
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an obstacle has been detected. The endogenous variables 
are given by V =  {CS,B1,B2,S}, where D(X) = {0, 1} 
for all X E V ,  CS is 1 iff the command stop is executed, 
Bi is 1 iff brake i is activated, and S is 1 iff the robot stops. 
The functions F = { Fx I X E V} are given by Fcs = U5, 
Fs, = Fs, = CS, and Fs = 1 iff B1 = 1 V B2 = 1. Fig. I 
shows the parent relationships between the variables. 
The submodel Ms,=o=(U, Vs,=o, Fs,=o) is given by 
Vs,=o ={CS,Bt,S} and Fs,=o={Fb5=Fcs, Fl,,= 
Fs, F�=1 iff B1 = 1 }. Then, Ss,=o(Us = 1) = 1. 
A probabilistic causal model (M, P) may then be given 
by the additional probability function P on D(U) defined 
by P(Us = 1) = 0.7 and P(Us = 0) = 0.3. D 
Figure I: Causal Graph 
3 INDEPENDENT CHOICE LOGIC 
In this section, we recall Poole's independent choice logic 
(ICL) [30, 31, 32]. We first recall a many-sorted first-order 
language of logic programs, which are given a semantics in 
Herbrand interpretations. We then recall the ICL itself. 
3.1 PRELIMINARIES 
Let if> be a many-sorted first-order vocabulary with the 
sorts object, time, and action. Let if> contain function sym­
bols of the sort objectk -t object, the function symbols 0 
and + 1 of the sorts time and time -t time, respectively, 
and function symbols of the sort objectk -taction, where 
k 2': 0. We call them object, time, and action symbols, re­
spectively. As usual, constant symbols are 0-ary function 
symbols. Let if> also contain predicate symbols of the sort 
objectk x time, where k 2: 0, and the predicate symbol do 
of the sort action x time. We call them .fluent and action 
predicate symbols, respectively. Let X be a set of variables, 
which are divided into object, time, and action variables. 
An object term is either an object variable from X or an 
expression of the form f(t1, ... ,tk), where f is a k-ary 
object symbol, and t1, ... , tk are object terms. A time term 
is either a time variable from X, or the time symbol 0, or 
an expression of the form s+ 1, where s is a time term. 
We use 1, 2, . . .  to abbreviate 0+ 1, 0+ 1 + 1, . . . .  An action 
term is either an action variable from X, or an expression 
of the form a(t1, ... , tk). where a is a k-ary action sym­
bol, and t1, ... , tk are object terms. 
We define formulas by induction as follows. The proposi­
tional constants false and true, denoted l_ and T, respec-
tively, are formulas. Atomic formulas (or atoms) are of 
the form do (a, s) or p(t t, ... ,tk.s), where a is an action 
term, s is a time term, p is a k-ary fluent predicate symbol, 
and t1, ... , tk are object terms. We call them action atoms 
and fluent atoms (or simply actions and fluents), respec­
tively. If¢ and 7j; are formulas, then also �¢and ( ¢1\ 7j; ). 
We use ( ¢ V 7j;) and ( ¢ <r- 7j;) to abbreviate �( �¢ 1\ �¢) 
and �( �¢ 1\ 7j;), respectively, and adopt the usual conven­
tions to eliminate parentheses. A clause is a formula of 
the form¢¢=- 7j;, where¢ (resp., 7j;) is an atom (resp., for­
mula) called its head (resp., body). 
Terms and formulas are ground iff they do not contain any 
variables. Substitutions, ground substitutions, and ground 
instances of terms and formulas are defined as usual. 
We use HB <I! (resp., HU <I!) to denote the Herbrand base 
(resp., Herbrand universe) over if>. A world I is a subset 
of HB <I!. We use I<11 to denote the set of all worlds over if>. 
A variable assignment a maps every variable from X to 
an element of HU <I! of appropriate sort. It is extended to 
object, time, and action terms as usual. The truth of formu­
las¢ in I under a, denoted I f=u ¢, is defined by induction 
as follows (we write I f= ¢ when ¢ is ground): 
• I Fu do(a, s) iff do(a(a), a(s)) E I; 
• I Fu p(t1, ... , tk) iffp(a(ti), ... ,a(tk)) E I; 
• I Fu �¢ iff not I f=u ¢; 
• I Fu (¢ 1\ ¢)iff I f=u ¢and I Fu 7f;. 
A world I is a model of a set of formulas F, denoted I f= F, 
iff I Fu F for all FE F and all a. 
3.2 INDEPENDENT CHOICE LOGIC 
A choice space C is a set of pairwise disjoint and non empty 
sets A <;:: HB <I!. The members of C are called its alterna­
tives and their elements atomic choices. A total choice of 
Cis a set B <;:: HB<I! such that IE n AI= 1 for all A E C. A 
probability P on a choice space C is a probability function 
on the set of all total choices of C. If C and all its alter­
natives are finite, then P can be defined by (i) a mapping 
P: U C--'> [0, 1] such that LaE A P(a) = 1 for all A E C, 
and (ii) P(B) = lhEsP(b) for all total choices B of C. 
A logic program Lis a set of clauses. We use ground(L) 
to denote the set of all ground instances of clauses in L. 
A logic program is acyclic iff a mapping"' from HB<I! to 
the non-negative integers exists such that K(p) > K(q) for 
all p, q E HB<I! where p (resp., q) occurs in the head (resp., 
body) of some clause in ground(L). The answer set (or 
stable model) of an acyclic logic program L is a world I 
such that for every p E HB <I!, it holds that I f= p iff I f= 7j; 
for some clause p <r- 7j; in ground(L). 
An independent choice logic theory (or ICL-theory) T = 
( C, L) consists of a choice space C, and an acyclic logic 
program L such that no atomic choice in C coincides 
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with the head of any clause in ground(£). A probabilis­
tic ICL-theory (or PICL-theory) T = ((C, L), P) consists 
of an ICL-theory (C, L) and a probability P on C. 
We next define the semantics of ICL- and PICL-theories 
by associating with them certain worlds and a probability 
distribution on certain worlds, respectively. A world I is a 
model of an ICL-theory T = ( C, L ), denoted If= T, iff I is 
an answer set of L U {p ¢= T I p E B} for some total choice 
B of C. In a PICL-theory T = ( ( C, L), P), the probability 
of such a world I is then defined as P(B). 
The following example illustrates how action descrip­
tions and probabilistic action descriptions can be encoded 
in ICL- and PICL-theories, respectively. 
Example 3.1 (mobile robot) Consider a mobile robot, 
which can navigate in an environment and pick up objects. 
We assume the constants r1 (robot), o1 (object), p1,P2 (po­
sitions), and 0 (time). The domain is described by the flu­
ents carrying(O, T) and at(X, Pos, T), where 0 E {ol} , 
XEb,o!}, PosE{pl,P2}, and TE{O,l, ... }. Here, 
carrying(o, t) and at(x,p, t) mean that the robot r1 is car­
rying the object o at time point t and that the robot or object 
x is at position p at time point t, respectively. The robot 
is endowed with the actions moveTo(Pos), pickUp(O), 
and putDown(O), where PosE {p!,P2} and 0 E {ol} . 
Here, moveTo(p), pickUp(o), and putDown(o) represent 
the actions "move to the position p", "pick up the ob­
ject o", and "put down the object o", respectively. The 
action pickUp(o) is stochastic: It is not reliable, and thus 
can fail. Furthermore, we have the predicates do(A, T), 
which represents the execution of an action A at time T, 
and fa(A , T) (resp., su(A , T)), which represents the fail­
ure (resp., success) of an action A executed at time T. 
An ICL-theory ( C, L) is then given by the choice space 
C = { {fa1=fa(pickUp(ol), t), SUt=su(pickUp(ol), t)} I 
t E {0, 1}} and the following logic program L: 
carrying(O, T+1) ¢= at(r1, Pas, T) II at(O, Pos, T) II 
do(pickUp(O), T) II su(pickUp(O), T); 
carrying ( 0, T +I) ¢= carrying ( 0, T) II 
-,do(putDown(O), T); 
at(r1, Pos, T+l) ¢= do(moveTo(Pos), T); 
at(r1, Pos, T+1) ¢= at(r1, Pos, T) II 
-,do(moveTo(Posl), T) II Posl f Pos; 
at(O, Pas, T +1) ¢= at(O, Pos, T)ll-,carrying(O, T); 
at(O, Pas, T+l) ¢= carrying(O, T) II 
do(moveTo(Pos), T); 
at(O, Pos, T+l) ¢= at(O, Pos, T) II 
-,do(moveTo(Pos1), T) II Pos1 f Pos; 
at(o1,P2,0) ¢= T; at(r1,P2,0) ¢= T. 
A PICL-theory ((C,L),P) is given by P({fa0,su1}) = 
P({suo,Ja1}) = 0.21, P({fa0,Ja1}) =0.09, and P({suo, 
su1}) = 0.49, which is obtained from P(fa0) = P(fa1) = 
0.3 and P(su0) = P(su1) = 0.7 by assuming probabilistic 
independence between {fa0, suo} and {fa1, sud. 0 
4 TRANSLATIONS 
In this section, we first give a translation of PICL-theories 
into probabilistic causal models. We then show how action 
executions at different time points can be included into this 
translation. We finally also provide a converse translation 
of binary probabilistic causal models into PICL-theories. 
4.1 FROM ICL TO CAUSAL MODELS 
We now define a translation of PICL-theories ( ( C, L), P) 
into probabilistic causal models. The main idea behind it 
is to use (i) each alternative A of the choice space C as an 
exogenous variable with the set of all atomic choices of A 
as domain, and (ii) each other ground atom as an endoge­
nous variable with binary domain, where the functions are 
specified by the clauses of the acyclic logic program L. 
In the sequel, let T = ( ( C, L), P) be a PICL-theory. The 
probabilistic causal model associated with T, denoted 
My = ((Uy, Vy, Fy ), Py ), is defined as follows: 
• Uy = C, where D(A) = A  for all A E C. 
• Vy = HB<I>\U C, where D(Vi)={l.,T} for all ViEVy. 
• Fy = { Fp I p E Vy}, where PAp is the set of all ground 
atoms that occur in the body of some p ¢= 1/J in ground ( L), 
and for every v E D(PAv) we define Fp(v) =Tiff v f= 1/J 
for some p ¢= 1/J in ground(£). Notice that then Fp = l. for 
all ground atoms p in no head of a clause in ground ( L). 
• Py(u) = P( { u(A) I A E C}) for all u E D(U). 
For ICL-theories T = ( C, L), the causal model associated 
with T, denoted My, is defined as the above (Uy, Vy, Fy ). 
Given a total choice B for C, we define un E D(Uy) 
by un(A) E B n A for all A E Uy=C. The following ex­
ample illustrates the above translation of PICL-theories 
into probabilistic causal models. 
Example 4.1 (mobile robot (continued)) Consider the 
PICL-theory T = ( ( C, L), P) given in Example 3.1. Its as­
sociated probabilistic causal model My= ((Uy, Vy, Fy ), 
Py) is given as follows. The exogenous variables are 
given by Uy = {Uo, Ul}, where Uo = {fa0, suo} = D(Uo) 
and U1 = {fa1, su1} = D(U1 ). The endogenous variables 
Vy are given by all the ground atoms that do not oc­
cur in Uy, where D(X) = {1., T} for all X E V y. For 
example, the ground atoms carrying(oi,O), at(rl,Pl, 1), 
do(moveTo(p1),0), and do(pickUp(o1), 1) are all in Vy. 
The functions F y = { Fv I p E V }  are as specified above. 
For example, Fat(r,,p,,l)=T iff either do(moveTo(pl), 
O)=T, or at(r1,p1,0)=T and do(moveTo(p2),0)=l.. 
Finally, Py is defined by Py(u)= P(Bu) for all u E D(U), 
where Bu is the total choice associated with u. For exam­
ple, PT(Uo = fa0, U1 = fa1)= P({fa0,fa1}) = 0.09. o 
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4.2 ACTION EXECUTION SETS 
We next describe how action executions at different time 
points in ICL can be incorporated into the probabilistic 
causal model Mr associated with a PICL-theory T. 
We define an action execution set E as a set of ground 
atoms of the form do( a, t). Intuitively, E represents the 
following set of action executions: For every do( a, t) E E, 
the action a is executed at time point t. 
Example 4.2 (mobile robot (continued)) An action exe­
cution set for the PICL-theory of Example 3.1 is given 
by E =  {do(moveTo(p1),0), do(pickUp(ol), 1)} , which 
represents the execution of the actions "move to p1" and 
"pick up o1" at time points 0 and 1, respectively. 0 
In the sequel, letT= ( ( C, L), P) be a PICL-theory. A.n ac­
tion execution set E can be taken into consideration in Mr 
either (I) by additionally expressing the elements of E as 
clauses in Land then generating Mr, or (2) by considering 
the submodel of Mr in which the elements of E are explic­
itly set to T. More formally, the probabilistic causal model 
M = ( (U, V, F), P) forT and E are defined as follows: 
(I) We define M as MT', where T' = ((e, LU {e <= T I 
e E E}), P). Then, the executions in E can be over­
ridden by explicitly setting them in M (for example, 
in counterfactual reasoning). 
(2) We define M as (Mr)E =(Mr)E=e• where e E 
D(E) is defined by e(X) = T for all X E E. Then, 
the executions in E are fixed in M: They do not occur 
in M and thus cannot be changed anymore. 
Since from a technical viewpoint, (I) is a special case 
of (2), we consider only (2) in the rest of this paper. The 
following example illustrates (I) and (2). 
Example 4.3 (mobile robot (continued)) Consider the 
PICL-theory T = ( ( e, L), P) given in Example 3.1, and 
the action execution set E given in Example 4.2. Un­
der the representation (I), we then obtain the probabilis­
tic causal model Mr•, where T'=((e,L'),P) and L '= 
LU {do(moveTo(pl),O) <= T,do(pickUp(o1), 1) <= T}. 
Here, alternative executions can be explored by considering 
submodels that are obtained from Mr• by explicitly setting 
the values of do(moveTo(p1),0) and do(pickUp(ol), 1), 
for example, to l_ and T, respectively. Under (2), we obtain 
the causal model (Mr)E =(Mr)E=eo where e(X)= T  
for all X E E. Here, the action executions in E are fixed 
and cannot be changed anymore. 0 
4.3 FROM CAUSAL MODELS TO ICL 
We finally also provide a converse translation of binary 
probabilistic causal models M = ((U, V, F), P) into PICL­
theories. The main ideas behind it are (i) to use the domains 
of the exogenous variables in U as alternatives in the choice 
space, and (ii) to represent the functions in F as clauses in 
an acyclic logic program under the answer set semantics. 
In the sequel, let M = ( (U, V, F), P) be a binary probab­
ilistic causal model, where D(X) = {0, 1} for all X E V ,  
F = {Fx I X E V }, and PAx is finite for every X E V .  
The PICL-theory associated with M, denoted TM = 
( (eM, L M), PM), is then defined as follows: 
• eM= { {ui = ui 1 ui E D(Ui)} 1 ui E u}; 
• L M={X =1 <= ¢i I X EV, iEI}, where ¢i, for every in­
dex i E J, is a conjunction of assignments Y = y, such that 
(i) Y E PAx, (ii) y E D(Y), and (iii) for all p E D(PAx ), 
it holds that V iE I¢i is true in p iff Fx (p) = 1; 
• PM(B) = P({(Ui,ui) IUi= UiEB}) for every total 
choice B of eM. 
Fer bin�ry causal models }.1 = (U, ll, F), the ICL-theory 
associated with M, denoted T M, is defined as the above 
(eM, L M). The following example illustrates the transla­
tion of probabilistic causal models into PICL-theories. 
Example 4.4 (stopping robot (continued)) Consider again 
the probabilistic causal model M=((U, V,F),P) given 
in Example 2.1. Its associated PICL-theory TM = ((eM, 
L M  ), PM) is given as follows. The choice space is 
given by eM = { {Us=1, Us=O} }. The acyclic logic pro­
gram L M is given by the following clauses: 
CS = 1 <= Us= 1; B1 = 1 <= CS = 1; 
Bz = 1 <= CS = 1; S = 1 <= B1 = 1 V Bz = 1. 
Finally, the probability function PM on C M 's total choices 
c1 ={Us = 1} and Cz = {Us= 0} is defined by PM(cl) = 
P(Us = 1) and PM(c2) = P(Us = 0). 0 
5 WEAK AND ACTUAL CAUSES 
In this section, we extend the notions of weak and actual 
cause by Halpern and Pearl [ 17] to ICL-theories. Infor­
mally, the main idea behind this extension is to define weak 
and actual causes in ICL-theories T as weak and actual 
causes in their associated causal models M T. 
Observe that even though [ 17] defines the notions of weak 
and actual cause only for the restricted case of a finite num­
ber of endogenous variables, the extended version of [ 17] 
also describes how these notions can be generalized to the 
infinite case. It also gives an example, which deals with in­
finite weak and actual causes, where such a generalization 
is necessary. In the sequel, we consider only the original 
definitions from [ 17], and we disallow infinite weak and 
actual causes, to avoid the above-mentioned problems. 
We first recall weak and actual causes from [17]. A primi­
tive event is an expression Y = y, where Y is a variable and 
y is a value for Y. The set of events is the closure of the set 
of primitive events under the Boolean operators .., and 11. 
The truth of an event¢ in M = (U, V, F) under u E D(U ), 
denoted (M, u) f= ¢, is inductively defined by: 
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• (M,u) f= Y = y  iffYM(u) = y; 
• (M, u) f= •¢ iff (M, u) f= ¢does not hold ; 
• (M, u) f= ¢/1 'ljJ iff (M, u) f= ¢and (M, u) f= '1/J. 
We use ¢(u) to abbreviate (M, u) f= ¢. For X� V and 
x E D(X) , we use r/!x(u) to abbreviate (Mx, u) p ¢. For 
X = {X1, . . .  ,Xk}�V with k2':1 and XiED(Xi), we 
use X= x1 · · ·Xk to abbreviate X1 = x1 /1 . . .  /1 Xk =Xk. 
Let M = (U, V, F) be a causal model. Let X s V and 
x E D(X) , and let ¢ be an event. Then, X= x is a weak 
cause of¢ under u iff the following conditions hold: 
ACI. X(u) = x and ¢(u). 
AC2. Some set of variables W�V\X and some values 
xED(X) , wED(W) exist such that (a) •rf>xw(u), and 
(b) rPxwz(u) for all Z � V \(XU W) and z = Z(u). 
Moreover, X = x is an actual cause of¢ under u iff addi­
tionally the following condition is satisfied: 
AC3. X is minimal. That is, no proper subset of X satis­
fies both ACI and AC2. 
We are now ready to define the notions of weak and actual 
cause for ICL-theories as follows. 
Definition 5.1 Let T = ( C, L) be an ICL-theory, 'ljJ be a 
conjunction of atoms, and ¢ be a formula. Let B be a total 
choice for C, and E be an execution set. Then, 'ljJ is a weak 
(resp., an actual) cause of¢ under B and E in T iff p( 'lj;(}) 
is a weak (resp., an actual) cause of p( rj!(}) under us in 
(MT ) E  for each ground substitution(}, where p(5) is ob­
tained from 5 by replacing every ground atom p by p = T. 
Example 5.1 (mobile robot (continued)) Consider again 
the mobile robot scenario described in Example 3.1. 
Suppose now that there are two objects o1 and 02, and 
that the robot r1 cannot hold them both in the same 
time. Consider the ICL-theory T = ( C, L ), where the 
choice space is given by C = { {fao,t = fa(pickUp(o), t), 
suo,t = su(pickUp(o), t)} I o E { 01, 02}, t E {0, 1, 2} }, 
and Lis given as in Example 3.1 except that the first clause 
is replaced by the following two clauses: 
carrying(O, T +1) <= ath, Pos, T) /1 at(O, Pos, T) /1 
do(pickUp(O), T) II su(pickUp(O), T) II 
•carryingObj (T); 
carryingObj (T) <= carrying ( 0, T). 
Assume that executing a pickup succeeds at every time 
point t E {0, 1, 2}, which is represented by the total choice 
B = { su0,t I o E { 01, 02}, t E {0, 1, 2} }, and that the robot 
r1 executes a pickup of 01 at time point 0, a move to P1 at 
time point 1, and a pickup of o2 at time point 2, which is 
expressed by the action execution set E= { do(pickUp(ol), 
0), do(moveTo(pl), 1), do(pickUp(o2), 2)}. We now 
show that o1 being at position P2 at time point 0 is an 
actual cause of the robot not carrying o2 at time point 2, 
that is, that 'ljJ = at ( o1 , p2, 0) is an actual cause of rjJ 
•carrying(o2, 2) under Band E in T. 
We show that at(o1,p2,0)=T is [In actual cause of 
carrying(o2, 2)=.L under us in (MT )E=(U, V, F). Obvi· 
ously, at(o1,p2,0)(us) = T  and carrying(o2,2)(us) = 
.L in (MT) E· That is, (ACI) holds. Consider next 
X={at(o1,P2,0)}, x={(at(o1,p2,0), T)}, X'={(at(o1, 
P2,0),.L)}, W = {at(o2,p1,t) I tE{0,1,2, ... }}, and 
w = {(Wi, T) I wi E W}. We then obtain carrying(o2, 
2)xw (us) = T. That is, (AC2) (a) holds. Furthermore, we 
obtain carrying(o2, 2)xw(us)=.L and Zxw(us)=Z(us) 
for Z = V\ (XUW) (setting W = w and thus inverting 
at(o2,p1, t) fortE {0, 1, 2, . .. } does not affect other flu· 
ents). That is, also (AC2) (b) holds. This shows that 
at(o1,p2,0) = T  is a weak cause of carrying(o2,2) =.L 
under us in (MT ) E. Since X is a singleton, also (AC3) 
holds. It thus follows that at(o1 ,p2, 0) = T is also an ac· 
tual cause of carrying(o2, 2) =.Lunder us in (MT ) E. 0 
The next example shows that we can also refer to the actu· 
ally executed actions in weak and actual causes, if we make 
use of representation (I) for action execution sets. 
Example 5.2 (waiting collector) We consider a simplified 
version of Example 3.1, where (i) we have only the fluent 
carrying(T) with T E {0, 1, ... } and the two actions 
wait and pickUp, and (ii) we assume that the action 
pickUp can fail or succeed (which depends on the time 
point of the execution of pickUp). Consider the ICL­
theory T = ( C, L), where the choice space is given by 
C = {{su(pickUp,t),fa(pickUp,t)}1tE{0,1}}, and L 
describes the dynamics of this simple scenario by means 
of the following two clauses: 
carrying(T + 1) <= do(pickUp, T) /1 su(pickUp, T) II 
•do(wait,T); 
carrying(T+1) <= carrying(T). 
Assume that executing a pickup succeeds at time point 0, 
but fails at time point 1, which is represented by the to­
tal choice B = {fa(pickUp, 1), su(pickUp, 0) }, and that 
the robot r1 waits at time point 0 and executes a pickup 
at time point 1, which is expressed by the action execu­
tion set E' = {do( wait, 0), do(pickUp, 1) }. It can now 
be shown [I OJ that the robot's waiting at time point 0 
is an actual cause of not carrying the object o1 at time 
point 2, that is, that 'ljJ = do( wait, 0) is an actual cause 
of¢= •carrying(2) under Band E = 0 in T' = (C, L '), 
where L'= LU{ do( wait, O)<=T, do(pickUp, 1)<=T}. 0 
6 EXPLANATIONS 
In this section, we extend the concept of a (causal) expla­
nation by Halpern and Pearl [ 18] to ICL-theories. 
We first recall the concept of an explanation from [ 18]. 
Let M = (U, V, F )  be a causal model. Let X� V and 
x E D(X), ¢ be an event, and C � D(U) be a set of con­
texts. Then, X = x is an explanation of ¢ relative to C iff 
the following conditions (EXI)-(EX4) hold: 
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EXl. ¢( u) holds, for each context u E C. 
EX2. X = x is a weak cause of ¢ under every u E C such 
that X(u) = x. 
EX3. X is minimal. That is, for every X' c X, some u E C 
exists such that X'(u) = xiX' and X'= xiX' is not a weak 
cause of¢ under u. 
EX4. X(u) = x and X(u') =J x for some u,u' E C. 
We now define explanations for ICL-theories as follows. 
Definition 6.1 Let T = ( C, L) be an ICL-theory, 'ljJ be a 
conjunction of atoms, and¢ be a formula. Let B be a set of 
total choices for C, and E be an execution set. Then, 'ljJ is 
an explanation of¢ under Band E in Tiff p( 'lj;8) is an ex­
planation of p( ¢8) under { UB I BE B} in (Mr )E for each 
ground substitution IJ, where p ts defined as in Def. 5.1. 
Example 6.1 (mobile robot (continued)) Consider a new 
version of the mobile robot scenario in Example 3.1, where 
we have the new fluent carryingObj(T), T E {0, 1, ... }, 
and carryingObj(t) means that the robot r1 is carrying 
an object at time point t. Let the ICL-theory T = (L, C) 
be defined by the choice space C = { { su(pickUp(oi), 0), 
fa(pickUp(oi), 0)}} and the logic program Las in Exam­
ple 3.1 except that the last two clauses are replaced by: 
carryingObj(T) {= carrying(O, T); 
at(o1,P1,0) ¢=T; atb,P1,0) ¢=T; 
su(pickUp(oi), 1) {= T. 
Assume that executing a pickup of o1 either succeeds 
or fails at time point 0, which is expressed by the 
set of total choices B = { B1 = { su(pickUp(oi), 0)}, B2 = 
{fa(pickUp(o1), 0)} }, and that the robot r1 executes a 
pickup of o1 at time points 0 and 1, which is represented 
by the action execution set E= {do(pickUp(o1),0), 
do(pickUp(oi), 1) }. It can now be shown [10] that car­
rying o1 at time point 1 is an explanation of carrying an 
object at time point 2, that is, 'ljJ = carrying ( o1, 1) is an ex­
planation of¢= carrying0bj( 2) under Band E in T. D 
7 PARTIAL EXPLANATIONS 
We finally extend the notions of partial and a-partial expla­
nations by Halpern and Pearl [18] to PICL-theories. 
We first recall the notions of partial and a-partial explana­
tions and of explanatory power from [18]. Let M = (U, V, 
F) be a causal model. Let X<;; V and x E D(X), let¢ be 
an event, let C <;; D(U) such that ¢(u) for all u E C. The 
expression ct =x denotes the unique largest subset C' of C 
such that X= xis an explanation of¢ relative to C'. 
Proposition 7.1 (See [8]) If X= x is an explanation of</> 
relative to some C' <;; C, then Ci=x is defined, and it con­
tains all u E C such that either X ( u) =J x, or X ( u) = x and 
X= x is a weak cause of</> under u. 
Let P be a probability function on C, and define 
I: P(u) I I: P(u) . 
u E c�=� 
X(u) = x 
u E C 
X(u) = x 
Then, X = x is called an a-partial explanation of </> rela­
tive to (C, P) iff ct=x is defined and P(Ci=x IX =x) 2: a. 
Moreover, X =  x is a partial explanation of </> relative 
to ( C, P) iff X = x is an a-partial explanation of </> rela­
tive to (C,P) for some a >0. Then, P(Ci=x IX=x) is 
called its explanatory power (or goodness). 
We are now ready to define a-partial explanations for 
PICL-theories. This then implicitly also defines partial ex­
planations and their explanatory power for PICL-theories. 
Definition 7.1 Let T= ((C, L), F) be a PICL-theory, let 
'ljJ be a conjunction of atoms, and let ¢ be a formula. Let B 
be a set of total choices for C, and let E be an action exe­
cution set. Then, 'ljJ is an a-partial explanation of</> under 
B and E in T iff p( 'lj;8) is an a-partial explanation of p( ¢8) 
relative to ({uB IBEB},Pr) in (Mr)E for every ground 
substitution 8, where pis defined as in Def. 5.1. 
Example 7.1 (mobile robot (continued)) We consider an­
other version of the mobile robot scenario in Example 3.1, 
where we assume two positions PI and p2, and two objects 
o1 and o2, which the robot r1 cannot hold in the same 
time. Let the PICL-theory T= ((L,C),P) be given by 
the choice space C = { { sua,t = su(pickUp(o), t),fao,t = 
fa(pickUp(o), t)} I (o, t) E {(o1,0), (o2, 2)}}, the logic 
program L as in Example 3.1 except that the last two 
clauses are replaced by the following clauses: 
at(o1,P1,0) ¢=T; at(o2,p2,0) ¢= T; at(r1,P1,0) ¢=T, 
and the probability function P obtained from P(fao,tl = 
0.3 and P(su0,t) = 0. 7 by assuming independence between 
the A E C. Suppose that either (a) executing a pickup of o1 
and o2 succeeds at time points 0 and 2, respectively, or (b) 
executing a pickup of o2 fails at time point 2, expressed by 
the set of total choices B = { B1, B2, B3 }, where 
Bt ={ su(pickUp(ol), 0), su(pickUp(o2), 2)}, 
B2={ su(pickUp(ol), O).,ja(pickUp(o2), 2) }, 
B3={fa(pickUp (ot), 0), fa(pickUp (D2), 2)}. 
Furthermore, assume that the robot r1 executes a pickup of 
the object o1 at time point 0, a move to p1 at time point 1, 
and a pickup of o2 at time point 2, which is expressed 
by the action execution set E = { d o(pickUp(ol), 0), 
do(moveTo(p1), 1), do(pickUp(o2), 2)}. It can now be 
shown [10] that carrying o1 at time point 1 is an a-partial 
explanation of not carrying o2 at time point 3, that is, 
that 'ljJ = carrying(o1, 1) is an a-partial explanation of 
</> = -.carrying(o2, 3) under B and E in T, where a = 
P(Bt) I (P(Bi)+P(B2)) = 0.49 I (0.49+0.21) = 0.7. D 
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8 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
We presented a combination of Pearl's structural-model ap­
proach to causality with Poole's independent choice logic. 
We showed how probabilistic theories in the independent 
choice logic can be mapped to probabilistic causal mod­
els. This mapping provides the independent choice logic 
with appealing concepts of causality and explanation from 
the structural-model approach. We illustrated this along 
Halpern and Pearl's sophisticated notions of actual cause, 
explanation, and partial explanation. Moreover, this map­
ping also adds first-order modeling capabilities and explicit 
actions to the structural-model approach. 
An interesting topic of future research is to explore the 
counterparts of other important concepts from the struc­
tural-model approach (such as probabilistic counterfactu­
als and probabilistic causal independence) in the indepen­
dent choice logic. Furthermore, it would be interesting 
to explore a generalization of the presented approach to 
non-acyclic logic programs, which may then involve non­
recursive causal models. Finally, another interesting topic 
is to explore how to define the concepts from the structural­
model approach directly in the independent choice logic. 
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